DEAR BARON FOCUSED GROWTH FUND SHAREHOLDER:

PERFORMANCE

Baron Focused Growth Fund (the "Fund") decreased 16.74% (Institutional Shares) in the first quarter. The Russell 2500 Growth Index (the "Index"), the benchmark against which we compare the performance of the Fund, decreased 23.22% and the S&P 500 Index decreased by 19.60% during the quarter. The S&P 500 Index measures the performance of large-cap U.S. companies.

Table I.
Performance
Annualized for periods ended March 31, 2020

	Baron Focused Growth Fund Retail Shares[1,2,3]	Baron Focused Growth Fund Institutional Shares[1,2,3,4]	Russell 2500 Growth Index[2]	S&P 500 Index[2]
Three Months[5]	(16.80)%	(16.74)%	(23.22)%	(19.60)%
One Year	(3.53)%	(3.23)%	(14.40)%	(6.98)%
Three Years	9.33%	9.61%	3.35%	5.10%
Five Years	6.15%	6.43%	3.64%	6.73%
Ten Years	9.29%	9.57%	10.10%	10.53%
Fifteen Years	8.24%	8.43%	8.26%	7.58%
Since Inception (May 31,1996)	10.39%	10.51%	6.99%	7.86%

While we are not pleased with the Fund's quarterly performance losses, we are pleased with the outperformance vs. our Index. This occurred as the Fund's **Disruptive Growth** investments, which represent almost 34% of the portfolio, outperformed in the quarter. This included the Fund's largest position, **Tesla, Inc.**, which continued to generate strong results despite worries about the COVID-19 pandemic. Tesla, which represented 20.7% of the Fund's net assets, continued to take share in the electric vehicle market with increased production and deliveries of its cars as they ramped production at their facility in Shanghai and began construction of a new factory in Berlin. As a result, the company's stock increased 25.26% in the first quarter, contributing to 190 bps of quarterly performance.

DAVID BARON
CO-PORTFOLIO MANAGER

RONALD BARON
CEO AND LEAD PORTFOLIO MANAGER

Retail Shares: BFGFX
Institutional Shares: BFGIX
R6 Shares: BFGUX

Our **Real/Irreplaceable Asset** companies, which represent over 26% of the portfolio, were the main detractors from performance in the first quarter as they decreased over 40% during the quarter due to concerns about the pandemic. This included two of the Fund's larger investments, **Vail Resorts, Inc.** and **Hyatt Hotels Corp.**, which represented 8.7% and 7.1% of the Fund, respectively. Vail declined 37.64% in the quarter as the company was forced to close its resorts in the middle of March, negatively impacting results during the prime Spring Break season and its earnings and cash flow for the year. As a result, the company cut its project capital spending this year and suspended its dividend for the next two quarters.

Hyatt declined 46.48% in the first quarter as investors were concerned with the impact of COVID-19 and its effect on the company given extensive travel restrictions both domestically and abroad. However, the company should be a little less vulnerable to declines as 60% of the business is

Performance listed in the above table is net of annual operating expenses. Annual expense ratio for the Retail Shares and Institutional Shares as of December 31, 2019 was 1.39% and 1.11%, but the net annual expense ratio was 1.35% and 1.10% (net of the Adviser's fee waivers). The performance data quoted represents past performance. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate; an investor's shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost. The Adviser reimburses certain Baron Fund expenses pursuant to a contract expiring on August 29, 2030, unless renewed for another 11-year term and the Fund's transfer agency expenses may be reduced by expense offsets from an unaffiliated transfer agent, without which performance would have been lower. Current performance may be lower or higher than the performance data quoted. For performance information current to the most recent month end, visit www.BaronFunds.com or call 1-800-99BARON.

1 Reflects the actual fees and expenses that were charged when the Fund was a partnership. The predecessor partnership charged a 15% performance fee through 2003 after reaching a certain performance benchmark. If the annual returns for the Fund did not reflect the performance fees for the years the predecessor partnership charged a performance fee, the returns would be higher. The Fund's shareholders will not be charged a performance fee. The performance is only for the periods before the Fund's registration statement was effective, which was June 30, 2008. During those periods, the predecessor partnership was not registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and was not subject to its requirements or the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code relating to registered investment companies, which, if it were, might have adversely affected its performance.

2 The indexes are unmanaged. The index performance is not Fund performance; one cannot invest directly into an index. The Russell 2500™ Growth Index measures are classified as growth and the S&P 500 Index of 500 widely the performance of small to medium-sized U.S. companies that held large cap U.S. companies. The indexes and the Fund are with dividends, which positively impact the performance results. Russell Investment Group is the source and owner of the trademarks, service marks and copyrights related to the Russell Indexes. Russell is a trademark of Russell Investment Group.

3 The performance data does not reflect the deduction of taxes that a shareholder would pay on Fund distributions or redemption of Fund shares.

4 Performance for the Institutional Shares prior to May 29, 2009 is based on the performance of the Retail Shares, which have a distribution fee. The Institutional Shares do not have a distribution fee. If the annual returns for the Institutional Shares prior to May 29, 2009 did not reflect this fee, the returns would be higher.

5 Not annualized.

coming through fees while only 40% is from hotels it owns. The company also continues to have a strong balance sheet and liquidity profile with an unborrowed $1.5 billion credit facility and $900 million of cash on the balance sheet. We continue to find its valuation even more attractive given the recent large stock price decline.

Penn National Gaming, Inc., a U.S. regional casino company, declined 50.51% in the first quarter as the company was forced to shut down its U.S. casino operations given COVID-19 concerns, and it remains to be seen when the casinos will reopen. However, we believe the company has adequate liquidity to be able to withstand the shutdown and has no real debt maturities until 2023. While the company did fully borrow from its $700 million revolver this quarter, we believe the increased cash on its balance sheet as well as recent rent relief from its landlord should be enough for the company to make it through the disruption to its earnings. As a result of the decline, the Fund lost 192 bps in the quarter.

Red Rock Resorts, Inc., an owner and operator of casinos in the Las Vegas Locals gaming market, declined 71.31% in the quarter as investors became concerned with the Las Vegas market given casino closures across the state of Nevada, employee furloughs, and other possible layoffs ahead. However, we believe given the recent refinancing of debt, the company should have enough liquidity to get through the downturn with no significant debt coming due until 2022. While the company may have to renegotiate some bank covenants, we believe this should occur given the temporary disruption to the business. As a result of the decline, the Fund lost 75 bps in the quarter.

The Fund's **Core Growth** investments declined but were still performed better than the market despite continuing to grow their earnings and cash flow and returning excess cash to shareholders through increased dividends and share repurchases. Real estate information and marketing services company **CoStar Group, Inc.**, which represented 15.9% of the Fund's net assets, continued to increase its sales of new products while also benefiting from recent acquisitions, where revenue increased more than expected. We continue to believe the company should be able to grow its revenue organically at a mid- to high-teens rate that, when combined with recent acquisitions, should result in annual revenue growth of 20% and annual EBITDA growth of 30%. However, the company's stock declined 1.85% in the quarter given macro commercial real estate concerns resulting from the pandemic, but it still significantly outperformed the Index's 23.22% decline.

Choice Hotels International, Inc., a global franchisor of economy and upscale hotels, decreased 40.87% in the quarter as investors worried about the impact COVID-19 would have on consumer travel with restrictions of large gatherings and event cancellations. However, they should have a smaller decline in business than lodging peers given that 80% of its business is leisure travel and almost all its hotels are in drive to markets. The company continues to have a strong balance sheet and has the financial flexibility to be able to withstand a downturn in business. However, given the recent quarterly decline the stock had a 217 bps impact on the Fund.

FactSet Research Systems, Inc., a provider of financial intelligence to the investment community, currently represents 8.6% of the Fund's net assets. It decreased 2.60% in the quarter despite continuing to grow organically at a mid-single-digit rate and continues to invest in new products and services that should accelerate revenue growth once completed. We continue to believe these investments will generate approximately 50% returns on capital.

Table II.
Total returns by category for the quarter ended March 31, 2020

	% of Net Assets (as of 3/31/2020)	Total Return (%)	Contribution to Return (%)
Disruptive Growth	**33.7**	**5.89**	**0.72**
Tesla, Inc.	20.7	25.26	1.90
Space Exploration Technologies Corp.	5.6	14.65	0.52
Iridium Communications Inc.	3.9	–9.37	–0.35
Guidewire Software, Inc.	3.5	–27.75	–0.87
Benefitfocus, Inc.	–	–52.67	–0.47
Core Growth	**34.8**	**–13.05**	**–5.44**
CoStar Group, Inc.	15.9	–1.85	–1.36
FactSet Research Systems, Inc.	8.6	–2.60	–0.18
GDS Holdings Limited	1.3	–5.84	–0.01
Adyen N.V.	1.1	–11.94	–0.09
Arch Capital Group Ltd.	3.7	–33.64	–1.63
Choice Hotels International, Inc.	4.2	–40.87	–2.17
Russell 2500 Growth Index		**–23.22**	
Real/Irreplaceable Assets	**26.5**	**–40.37**	**–11.79**
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd.	–	–0.54	0.01
American Homes 4 Rent	2.3	–11.32	–0.46
Manchester United plc	3.6	–24.49	–0.60
Vail Resorts, Inc.	8.7	–37.64	–3.72
Hyatt Hotels Corp.	7.1	–46.48	–4.35
Penn National Gaming, Inc.	2.8	–50.51	–1.92
Red Rock Resorts, Inc.	2.0	–71.31	–0.75
Cash	**5.0**	**0.12**	**0.00**
Fees	**–**	**–0.28**	**–0.23**
Total	**100.0**	**–16.74***	**–16.74***

Sources: FactSet PA, BAMCO, and Russell, Inc.

* Represents the blended return of all share classes of the Fund.

Table III.
Performance
Periods Baron Focused Growth Fund underperformed

	Internet Bubble	Baron Growth Stocks Underperform 2014-2016
	Annualized Returns	
	10/8/1998 to 3/9/2000	12/31/2013 to 12/31/2016
Baron Focused Growth Fund (Institutional Shares)	41.77%	0.45%
Russell 2500 Growth Index	126.53%	5.45%
S&P 500 Index	32.29%	8.87%

An investor cannot invest directly into an index.

From 2014 through 2016, the Fund invested in several businesses whose stocks underperformed when they were investing in their businesses. **CoStar Group, Inc.** and **Tesla, Inc.** are among these businesses. Their stocks outperformed in 2019 and the first quarter of 2020 as investments they made during the prior six years began to generate returns. While the Fund's 10-year performance still slightly lags the Index, most of this underperformance was driven by portfolio company performance between 2014 and 2016.

We believe the Fund's underperformance from 2014 through 2016 is analogous to instances when after brief periods of underperformance, the Fund subsequently outperformed for an extended period. For example, in the 18-month period from October 1998 through March 2000, at the height of the Internet Bubble, the Fund, which owned no internet stocks, increased 41.77% annualized while the Index increased 126.53% annualized. This was immediately prior to the Internet Bubble bursting and the Index falling materially over the next eight years. The Fund increased in value during that period. (Please see Tables III and IV.)

Similar to the Fund's relatively strong performance in the post-Internet Bubble period, we expect the Fund to perform well over the next several years. This is despite our expectation that there will be periods when value stocks outperform the growth stocks in which we have invested. We can certainly give no assurance this will be the case. Currently, we believe some of our growth companies are now trading as if they are value stocks despite having strong liquidity and balance sheets to be able to make it through the current disruption caused by the pandemic.

Since its inception on May 31, 1996, the Fund's 10.51% annualized performance has exceeded that of its benchmark by an average of over 350 bps per year. This means that a hypothetical $10,000 investment in Baron Focused Growth Fund nearly 24 years ago would now be worth approximately $108,000! If an investor had instead hypothetically invested $10,000 in the Russell 2500 Growth Index, it would be worth approximately $50,000. (Please see Tables I and IV.)

Baron Focused Growth Fund's beta has averaged 0.78 since inception. This means the Fund has been 78% as volatile as the Index. As a result of the Fund's strong absolute and relative returns and lower risk, the Fund has achieved 5.16% annual "alpha," a measure of risk-adjusted performance, since inception.

Table IV.
Performance
Millennium to Present. The Impact of Not Losing Money.

	Millennium Internet Bubble to Financial Panic 12/31/1999 to 12/31/2008		Millennium Internet Bubble to Present 12/31/1999 to 3/31/2020		Inception 5/31/1996 to 3/31/2020	
	Value $10,000	Cumulative	Value $10,000	Cumulative	Value $10,000	Cumulative
Baron Focused Growth Fund (Institutional Shares)	$12,732	27.32%	$44,876	348.76%	$108,287	982.87%
Russell 2500 Growth Index	$ 6,931	(30.69)%	$27,973	179.73%	$ 50,011	400.11%
S&P 500 Index	$ 7,188	(28.12)%	$26,067	160.67%	$ 60,657	506.57%

* An investor cannot invest directly into an index.

Baron Focused Growth Fund didn't make much money from the peak of the Internet Bubble on December 31, 1999 through the trough of the Financial Crisis on December 31, 2008. But…we did make something…which gave you a much better outcome than if you had hypothetically invested in the S&P 500 Index. Both indexes lost a material amount of money during that period. (Please see Table IV.)

Due to the "magic" of compounding and of not losing money from the Millennium Internet Bubble to the Financial Panic period, $10,000 hypothetically invested in Baron Focused Growth Fund at the Fund's inception on May 31, 1996 was worth $108,287 on March 31, 2020. That is more than twice the value of a hypothetical investment of the same amount in the Index. (Please see Table IV.)

Table V.
Top contributors to performance for the quarter ended March 31, 2020

	Year Acquired	Market Cap When Acquired (billions)	Quarter End Market Cap or Market Cap When Sold (billions)	Total Return	Percent Impact
Tesla, Inc.	2014	$31.2	$96.5	25.26%	1.90%
Space Exploration Technologies Corp.	2017	–	–	14.65	0.52
Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings, Ltd.	2020	2.4	2.3	–0.54	0.01

Tesla, Inc. designs, manufactures, and sells fully electric vehicles, solar products and energy storage solutions. Shares increased as the company reported robust quarterly results due to strong short-term execution and improving long-term growth and sustainability. Despite global COVID-19 disruptions, long-term expectations remain high due to Tesla's differentiated products and healthy unit economics. We believe Tesla's China factory project will provide an important growth layer in both the short and long term, and the newly released Model Y will support a fast recovery.

Norwegian Cruise Line Holdings Ltd., an operator of cruise lines under the Norwegian, Oceania, and Regent brands, contributed to first quarter performance during the period held. We exited the stock as we anticipate a prolonged recovery from the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic for the cruise line industry.

Table VI.
Top detractors from performance for the quarter ended March 31, 2020

	Year Acquired	Market Cap When Acquired (billions)	Quarter End Market Cap (billions)	Total Return	Percent Impact
Hyatt Hotels Corp.	2009	$4.2	$ 4.9	–46.48%	–4.35%
Vail Resorts, Inc.	2013	2.3	5.9	–37.64	–3.72
Choice Hotels International, Inc.	2010	1.9	3.4	–40.84	–2.17
Penn National Gaming, Inc.	2019	2.5	1.5	–50.51	–1.92
Arch Capital Group Ltd.	2003	0.9	11.6	–33.64	–4.35

Shares of global hotelier **Hyatt Hotels Corp.** declined in the first quarter due to investor concerns over the impact of travel restrictions as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak. The company has a strong balance sheet and liquidity profile with an unborrowed $1.5 billion credit facility and $900 million of cash on the balance sheet. We believe valuations remain attractive and the company will be less vulnerable to declines as 60% of the business is fee-based and 40% is owned.

Shares of global ski operator **Vail Resorts, Inc.**, declined in the quarter as the company closed all its resorts in mid-March for the remainder of the ski season due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Despite the significant decline in earnings, we believe Vail should be able to get through the disruption, given its strong balance sheet and free cash flow profile with manageable debt maturities over the coming years.

Shares of global hotel franchisor **Choice Hotels International, Inc.**, decreased in the first quarter due to investor concerns over COVID-19's impact on travel. We think the decline in business will be less than that of its competitors, as 80% of the business is leisure travel and almost all are in drive-to markets. Choice continues to have a strong balance sheet, and we believe the business is in a good position to mitigate the effects of this downturn given its asset light, fee-based business model.

Shares of **Penn National Gaming, Inc.**, a regional casino company with assets across the U.S., declined sharply in the quarter as the company closed all its casinos due to the COVID-19 outbreak. We believe Penn National, which has no material debt maturities until 2023, has adequate liquidity to withstand the shutdown. While the company did fully borrow from its $700 million revolver this quarter, we believe the increased cash on its balance sheet should be enough to carry it through the disruption.

Arch Capital Group Ltd. is a specialty insurance company based in Bermuda. The company reported better-than-expected quarterly earnings with book value per share up 23%. However, the stock underperformed due to concerns that widespread business closures as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic could cause higher losses for business interruption and event cancellation insurance policies. A recession could also cause higher losses for the economically sensitive mortgage insurance business. We continue to own the stock due to Arch's strong management team and underwriting discipline.

Investment Strategy & Portfolio Structure

Despite the current market volatility and hopefully temporary value destruction in the Fund, the strategy of Baron Focused Growth Fund has not changed. The Fund continues to invest for the long term in a focused portfolio of what we believe are appropriately capitalized, well managed, small- and mid-cap growth businesses at attractive prices. We attempt to create a portfolio of less than 20 securities diversified by GICS sectors that will be approximately 80% as volatile (as measured by beta) as the market. Since inception, the Fund has generated 92% of the upside when the market rises but just 78% of the downside when the market declines. Businesses in which the Fund invests are identified by our analysts and portfolio managers using the Firm's proprietary research and time-tested investment approach.

As of March 31, 2020, the Fund held 16 investments. The Fund's average portfolio turnover for the past three years was 6.8%. This means the Fund has an average holding period for its investments of almost 15 years. This contrasts sharply with the average SMID-cap growth mutual fund, which typically turns over its portfolio every 21 months. From a quality standpoint, the Fund's investments have higher earnings and sales growth than the holdings in the benchmark, higher normalized margins when they are not making investments, stronger returns on invested capital, and lower betas. We believe these metrics are important to limit risk for this concentrated portfolio.

While focused, the Fund is diversified by sector. The Fund's weightings are significantly different than those of the Index. For example, the Fund is heavily weighted in Consumer Discretionary businesses with 45.3% of the portfolio in this sector versus just 10.8% for the Index. Further, the Fund has no biotechnology or pharmaceutical equity investments. This is due to the volatility of those stocks, which has made them inappropriate for this focused fund. The Fund is further diversified by investments in businesses at different stages of growth and development as discussed above and shown below.

Table VII.
Disruptive Growth Companies as of March 31, 2020

	Percent of Net Assets	Year Acquired	Cumulative Return Since Initial Purchase
Tesla, Inc.	20.7%	2014	109.3%
Space Exploration Technologies Corp.	5.6	2017	70.4
Iridium Communications Inc.	3.9	2019	–17.4
Guidewire Software, Inc.	3.5	2013	71.6

Disruptive Growth firms accounted for 33.7% of the Fund's net assets. On current metrics, these businesses, during some periods, may appear expensive; however, we think they will continue to grow and, if we are correct, have the potential to generate exceptional returns over time. Examples of these companies include electric vehicle leader **Tesla, Inc.**, commercial satellite company **Iridium Communications Inc.** and systems software provider to the insurance industry **Guidewire Software, Inc.**

Table VIII.
Investments with Real/Irreplaceable Assets as of March 31, 2020

	Percent of Net Assets	Year Acquired	Cumulative Return Since Initial Purchase
Vail Resorts, Inc.	8.7%	2013	175.0%
Hyatt Hotels Corp.	7.1	2009	74.6
Manchester United plc	3.6	2012	14.6
Penn National Gaming, Inc.	2.8	2019	–39.7
American Homes 4 Rent	2.3	2018	13.0
Red Rock Resorts, Inc.	2.0	2017	–59.4

Companies that own what we believe are **Real/Irreplaceable Assets** represented 26.5% of net assets. **Vail Resorts, Inc.**, owner of the premier ski resort portfolio in the world, upscale lodging brand **Hyatt Hotels Corp.**, and storied English Premier League sports franchise **Manchester United plc** are examples of companies we believe possess meaningful brand equity and barriers to entry that equate to pricing power over time.

Table IX.
Core Growth Investments: Growth, Dividends, and Share Repurchases as of March 31, 2020

	Percent of Net Assets	Year Acquired	Cumulative Return Since Initial Purchase
CoStar Group, Inc.	15.9%	2014	174.4%
FactSet Research Systems, Inc.	8.6	2008	481.0
Choice Hotels International, Inc.	4.2	2010	197.3
Arch Capital Group Ltd.	3.7	2003	681.6
GDS Holdings Limited	1.3	2020	–5.7
Adyen N.V.	1.1	2020	–12.0

Core Growth investments, steady growers that continually return excess free cash flow to shareholders, represented 34.8% of net assets. Examples of these companies include commercial real estate data supplier **CoStar Group, Inc.** and **Choice Hotels International, Inc.** Choice employs a capital-light franchise model for its economy and upscale hotel brands. This model allows the company to return cash to shareholders through buybacks and dividends while still achieving strong revenue and earnings growth. This would be the case regardless of where we are in the lodging cycle. As one of the leading financial intelligence systems for the asset management industry, **FactSet Research Systems, Inc.** continues to grow into new areas via fixed income, risk management, and, most recently, wealth management. This should enable the company to grow while generating a steady stream of recurring cash flow that it uses for acquisitions and share buybacks.

Portfolio Holdings

For the quarter ended March 31, 2020, the Fund's top 10 holdings represented 82.0% of net assets. A number of these investments have been successful and were purchased when they were smaller businesses. We believe they continue to offer significant further appreciation potential although we cannot guarantee that will be the case.

The top five positions in the portfolio, **Tesla, Inc.**, **CoStar Group, Inc.**, **Vail Resorts, Inc.**, **FactSet Research Systems, Inc.** and **Hyatt Hotels Corp.** all have, in our view, significant competitive advantages due to irreplaceable assets, strong brand awareness, technologically superior know-how, or exclusive data that is integral to their operations. We think these businesses cannot be easily duplicated, which enhances their potential for superior earnings growth and returns over time.

Table X.
Top 10 holdings as of March 31, 2020

	Year Acquired	Market Cap When Acquired (billions)	Quarter End Market Cap (billions)	Quarter End Investment Value (millions)	Percent of Net Assets
Tesla, Inc.	2014	$31.2	$96.5	$47.2	20.7%
CoStar Group, Inc.	2014	6.2	21.5	36.4	15.9
Vail Resorts, Inc.	2013	2.3	5.9	19.8	8.7
FactSet Research Systems, Inc.	2008	2.5	9.9	19.6	8.6
Hyatt Hotels Corp.	2009	4.2	4.9	16.3	7.1
Space Exploration Technologies Corp.	2017	–	–	12.7	5.6
Choice Hotels International, Inc.	2010	1.9	3.4	9.5	4.2
Iridium Communications Inc.	2014	0.6	3.0	9.0	3.9
Arch Capital Group Ltd.	2003	0.9	11.6	8.5	3.7
Manchester United plc	2012	2.3	2.5	8.3	3.6

Baron Focused Growth Fund

Thank you for investing in Baron Focused Growth Fund. We continue to work hard to justify your confidence and trust in our stewardship of your family's hard-earned savings. We also continue to try to provide you with information we would like to have if our roles were reversed. This is so you can make an informed judgment about whether Baron Focused Growth Fund remains an appropriate investment for your family.

Respectfully,

Ronald Baron
CEO and Lead Portfolio Manager

David Baron
Co-Portfolio Manager

Investors should consider the investment objectives, risks, and charges and expenses of the investment carefully before investing. The prospectus and summary prospectus contain this and other information about the Funds. You may obtain them from its distributor, Baron Capital, Inc., by calling 1-800-99BARON or visiting www.BaronFunds.com. Please read them carefully before investing.

Risks: The Adviser believes that there is more potential for capital appreciation in small and medium-sized companies and using non-diversification, but there also may be more risk. Specific risks associated with non-diversification include increased volatility of the Fund's returns and exposure of the Fund to greater risk of loss in any given period. Securities of small and medium-sized companies may be thinly traded and they may be more difficult to sell during market downturns. The Fund may not achieve its objectives. Portfolio holdings are subject to change. Current and future holdings are subject to risk.

The discussions of the companies herein are not intended as advice to any person regarding the advisability of investing in any particular security. The views expressed in this report reflect those of the respective portfolio managers only through the end of the period stated in this report. The portfolio manager's views are not intended as recommendations or investment advice to any person reading this report and are subject to change at any time based on market and other conditions and Baron has no obligation to update them.

This report does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of any offer to buy securities of Baron Focused Growth Fund by anyone in any jurisdiction where it would be unlawful under the laws of that jurisdiction to make such offer or solicitation.

Beta: measures a fund's sensitivity to market movements. The beta of the market (Russell 2500 Growth Index) is 1.00 by definition.

Alpha: measures the difference between a fund's actual returns and its expected performance, given its level of risk as measured by beta.

Upside Capture explains how well a fund performs in time periods where the benchmark's returns are greater than zero.

Downside Capture measures how well a fund performs in time periods where the benchmark's returns are less than zero.

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